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Shortly after Hurricane Katrina revealed some startling vul-
nerabilities of U.S. empire and emphasized divisions of race
and class in the nation, New Orleans native Brian Azcona sat
down with a pioneer of environmental history to discuss what
lessons the field might provide in the storm’s wake. Donald
Worster, who grew up in Kansas and today is the Hall Distin-
guished Professor of History at the University of Kansas, drew
parallels between the Katrina disaster and a disaster closer to
his home and personal experience, the Dust Bowl, his treat-
ment of which has become the standard historical work on the
1930s ecological disaster. The strategic position of New Or-
leans in the U.S. empire demands the city and the levies that
hold out the Mississippi River be rebuilt, just as the impor-
tance of Great Plains agriculture to the nation warranted that
land-use—ill-adapted to the dry plains environment as it was—
be sustained by massive federal subsidies. The logic behind
that national empire persists, to be questioned further.
BA: Brian Azcona
DW: Donald Worster
BA: After Hurricane Katrina, references to text in environmental
history and interviews with environmental historians, including Ari
Kelman and one of your students Ted Steinberg, appeared in major
media outlets such as the Wall Street Journal and New York Times.
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DW: My phone rang several times, people from Time magazine to
the Los Angeles Times. I think people feel environmental history
here has a real relevance.
BA: How can environmental history explain the significance of
Hurricane Katrina?
DW: What’s happened with Katrina in New Orleans has been
conditioned by what’s happened in the past—a project of massive
intervention into a natural system, hydrology and ecosystems. This
is precisely what environmental historians study. Not enough have
studied New Orleans and the Mississippi. We have to know what
we did and why we did it there over time; to what extent were
economic forces the principal driving factor; to what extent was
demography and population growth. That city is the imprint of a lot
of people and forces, not just the Army Corps of Engineers or the
chamber of commerce, just as there are many levels of responsi-
bility for what happened. But I think one of the questions that envi-
ronmental historians will ask is a question that, in a sense, John
McPhee asks in his book of essays in the The Control of Nature.
Are you familiar with that book?
BA: Yes. But please explain.
DW: McPhee wrote on the Achafalaya and how the Mississippi
River is trying to change its course. The assumption is that we
have nature under control. It is being questioned today, as I think it
must be questioned.
What we must ask is where does that assumption come from?
How does it manifest itself? To what extent has this control-ideol-
ogy been expressed at high levels of power and money in society
and in the state, but also right down to the local neighborhoods of
poor people who may live with a feeling of security since nature is
supposedly under control by some big powerful invisible forces out
there. But we are all shocked when we lose that control. That, to
me, was McPhee’s question twenty years ago, and it is a question
environmental historians come back to again and again. Is there
any way we could ever create a massive city in that situation that
is stable; that we could ever control the Mississippi? I’m not talk-
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ing about all the ways in which we have augmented the problem,
like global warming and erosion, but essentially the question of
what, as a culture, we thought we were achieving? The domina-
tion of nature is a question environmental historians have looked at
for some time, that cultural ideology, where it comes from, and
what it has done.
BA: The responses to Katrina by those with power go back to the
need for more control—”build the levies higher.” They look at the
event as a technocratic problem. I have not seen a fundamental
rethinking of the relationship between society and nature or the
ideology of the domination of nature.
DW: Doesn’t everybody want to go back to living there, basically
premised on the idea that we can control nature and that we can
make life secure, safe and happy and prosperous? There may be
levels of skepticism about it. But most cry, “Bring out the Dutch
engineers. They can hold off the North Sea so why the hell can’t
we hold off the Mississippi?” Or look at all the wonderful gates
that Venice built to stop tidal surges or that the British have built to
stop tidal surges up the Thames River.”
McPhee’s book suggests that we are up against a power that
is going to defy us no matter what. Even if we control the problem
of flooding and hurricanes in New Orleans, how do you make the
Mississippi stay where it is? The whole state of Louisiana was
created by the Mississippi river. Now, it wants to jump as it has
done repeatedly over millions of years. We spend billions to make
the Mississippi go where it should go—which is right where it is
now. Behind this effort there is, of course, the huge cultural im-
perative about the control of water and the building of an Ameri-
can empire. It built the Erie Canal in the 1820s. Before that, it was
the dream of Thomas Jefferson and the founding fathers of creat-
ing an empire—or, as Jefferson called it, an “Empire of Liberty.”
We would be an empire unlike the British Empire, that is, an em-
pire of freedom and liberty, of free people living on the land. This
new empire involved expansion to the west coast and controlling
the river systems. At the heart of it was the control of the Missis-
sippi; that was the crucial part of the creation of this continental
Social Thought & Research
114
empire. From the Louisiana Purchase, they began to see what was
possible. We have this incredible river system, almost unlike any
other on its scale, coming out of some of the richest farmland in the
world, the richest extensive body of great soils threaded through
with these rivers. There are a few gaps in it. That’s what the Erie
Canal was designed to fill, so you could go from New York City,
the empire state and the empire city, up the Hudson, through the
Erie Canal into the Great Lakes, and eventually into the Mississippi
down to New Orleans. New Orleans is the pivotal point in this
system of rivers and soils and agricultural production. It was one
end point in building the colossal American “Empire of Liberty.”
BA: So, there is this empire to which the control of the Mississippi
is essential component. But from my personal experience, speak-
ing as a New Orleanian, that control sustains a unique culture.
And, in my own opinion, that culture offers an alternative to the
culture of empire. I know I’m romanticizing this to a certain de-
gree, but people live there in a way that they don’t live in the rest of
the nation. Could these forms of control also give rise to social or
cultural contradictions?
DW: Well of course it is more complex than the complaint that
Americans are all imperialists. Even in Jefferson, in the very phrase
I just used, “Empire of Liberty,” there is a contradiction. We live
with contradictions, as any culture. There are contradictions within
individuals. But the creation of New Orleans as the great port at
the end of the Mississippi river system is not an accident. It wasn’t
created by a group of lotus eaters who just went there to have
some fun. The city was created as a port for the transportation of
economic goods back and forth—e.g., cotton. Surely the people of
New Orleans are there because of that. There are many other
places they could have lived, and whatever they would have cre-
ated would not have been the same, but the fundamental reason
for all of them being there is, it seems to me, the central place it
plays in the national system of rivers and transportation. That’s
why nobody is questioning it now, because it seems to be the logic
of nature, as well as the logic of nations and transportation. People
may come there to have a good time, let the good times roll and so
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on, but they are not there for reasons that are divorced from their
economic function, their ecological function. If you carry out the
logic of creating a great economic empire in North America, New
Orleans has, in that sense, a predestined place to play in it. And it
has to be created there against all forces of nature. You have to
create this great control structure, which itself is always going to
be problematic and vulnerable to the power of the natural world
which can slap it in the face. That is our predicament. We are
never going to be secure with empire. It is always going to be
vulnerable to enormous surges of power, of rivers, of floods, of
hurricanes. It would have been nice to have put New Orleans in a
part of the world that is earthquake proof, hurricane proof, and
flood proof; instead it ends up in the center of all kinds of natural
disaster possibilities. But the cultural imperative means that we
will keep it there, and we will spend a lot of money to do it.
BA: Then it is inevitable in the empire that we have, this society
that we have, that we settle these risky areas?
DW: I’m not suggesting that it is inevitable in some kind of divine
or cosmic way. It’s inevitable given the logic of expanding wealth
and power. What country has ever turned down empire when given
the chance? The United States is not unique in this sense. We
pursued a continental empire, not the whole continent but from
coast to coast. Half of that territory is extraordinarily dry. Large
parts of it are severely prone to earthquakes. Other parts are se-
verely prone to tornados and hurricanes. There is very little of this
country that is not fairly unstable. It has huge continental climate
extremes. We are never going to achieve perfect control over it,
but most of us, to some degree or another, expect it. Even if you
are poor you expect it to work. You expect when you turn on your
tap the water should come out reliably. Of course those who have
the most at stake expect it most. The green lawn will always be
green. The lights will always stay on. The pool will always be full,
and the water will always be clean. It seems to me that as you
want more power and more wealth from nature you raise the stakes.
With agricultural, urban, and suburban development the bed of the
Mississippi River keeps rising higher and higher; so, the levies have
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got to keep getting bigger and bigger. It seems to be the perfect
metaphor for what we call industrial civilization. We just keep rais-
ing the stakes. We want more and more wealth and more and
more power out of this place. That is what empire is really about!
We want a bigger empire than we have got. And, in a way, we are
just raising the levies higher and higher. You have to wonder, if you
are a gloom-and-doom sort like me, are we not just setting our-
selves up for an even bigger catastrophe in the long run?
BA: You mention the social contradictions as well as the inevitable
power of natural forces that give rise to crisis, such as Katrina.
You have studied other crises like the Dust Bowl. Can we learn
something from the Dust Bowl to inform our understanding of this
crisis?
DW: I think the Dust Bowl follows pretty much the pattern I’ve
just described. Up to the 1930s the settling of the Great Plains of
course was controlled by the government. They did the land sur-
veys, provided the military, acquired the land, and fought off
Indians. But nonetheless the risks were still present at the indi-
vidual level. Go back to the 1890s drought on the Great Plains
and note that most people left. They had to take the risks. They
farmed, they lost, and they left. Whole counties were depopu-
lated, with ninety percent of the population leaving. In the 1930s
that changed, partly because of the New Deal, but I suspect other
governments would do the same. We’ve certainly done the same
since then. Republicans as well as Democrats have accepted
responsibility for making the Great Plains as secure as possible,
with all kinds of federal aid and disaster relief. Since then, every
time there is a drought, even a tiny one, even a miniscule drought,
the federal government sends disaster money. So we’ve basically
removed a hell of a lot of the risk from individuals and placed it on
the taxpayers.
The pattern here is we have centralized risk with the environ-
ment in Washington D.C. and in the state. The state is expected
now to bail people out in an environmental crisis. The effect of that
is, of course,—and this may sound social Darwinist, I don’t think it
is—to remove the disciplining force; the adaptive influence that
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once existed on this planet. People stay in marginal places, whether
it be the droughty plains or flood plains in the Mississippi valley,
because the risk is to some extent shared. We continue to push into
marginal areas, dangerous areas, and expect government to be
there. It’s part of the whole FEMA mentality, which some of con-
servative Republicans were challenging but did not acknowledge
that people moved into these areas to serve the needs of the state
and to create this great agricultural surplus that we can ship around
the world to pay for our Sonys and Toyotas.
That is precisely what happened in the 1930s. Of course the
people who made out best then were the people who could afford,
for whatever reasons, to hang on. They might have had a job as a
teacher or as a banker and could buy out the people who couldn’t
afford to stay, like my parents who ended up moving to California.
The people who stayed made out pretty well. They saw great ag-
ricultural abundance return for a while. Generation by generation,
after the region depopulates and the land ownership becomes more
concentrated, the government continues to underwrite these people,
partly through subsidies, partly through drought assistance, partly
through giving them secure water rights in the Ogallala. This is the
way the modern world deals with environmental vulnerabilities of
all sorts, not just with disasters but even on a more mundane level.
We keep talking about how everybody is supposed to be self-reli-
ant, but nobody believes it, at least in these times.
BA: What seems to be escaping any sort of critique in the after-
math of Katrina is any critical reflection on the market. In fact a lot
of there’s been a lot of praise celebrating the role of private enti-
ties, such as the praise for Wal-Mart who got drinking water into
New Orleans when the government couldn’t. Big Oil, as well, has
claimed deregulation passed the test. Is that what has happened
with, let’s say, the Dust Bowl. Was there praise of entrepreneurial
sprit as something that will get us through?
DW: First they pay tribute to the sprit of the people, their plucki-
ness under any kind of calamity. And they pay tribute to our entre-
preneurial culture that encourages people to go out and solve their
own problems. Don’t stand around waiting for someone to solve
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them. Of course this is merely back-patting ideology. It has some
truth to it. We have to acknowledge that entrepreneurial energies
are necessary and that an entrepreneurial culture has some virtues
and that those have a role to play. I don’t think Wal-Mart is some
great savior of the city, but you don’t want a culture that stands by
and says, “Uncle, Joe, Come in and solve our problems.” The prob-
lem is: What are the limits of that solution? How far will it take us?
We didn’t as self-reliant individuals create the whole system that
we have in place up and down the Mississippi river. We didn’t
create the levies. Those were created by a military bureaucracy.
For me the question of capitalism is not whether it is good or bad in
some absolute sense. It can be a good servant and a bad master.
How can capitalism, or the entrepreneurial spirit, be used effec-
tively?
One fundamental fact that environmental history teaches is
that capitalism is not about sustainability. It’s about unlimited growth.
You are never going to get sustainable cities out of Wal-Mart.
There’s no profit in sustainability.
BA: There’s an interesting history of flood control. During the
early settlement of New Orleans, it was the legal responsibilities of
private landholders to build levees. But that didn’t work. It gave
rise to conflicts. If your levy breaks, my land is dry. So there was
sabotage. Flood protection by private property holders was inher-
ently contradictory. And the federal role was essential.
DW: You could do that if you had just a handful of people. You
could let this rivalry go on where the stakes were pretty low. When
stakes are high, when in fact a whole nation depends on maintain-
ing security and control, depending on private self-interest is not
going to work. You may regard the state, either from a left or right
point of view, as a demonic force. But you cannot have the control
of nature without it. There is no other agency that is even close to
being adequate to do the job. It is not going to be done by the
chamber of commerce. The biggest corporation in the United States
can’t do it. To the extent that we want to control nature—and we
do want to control the Mississippi river and we do want to put a
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city there—it is going to require the biggest state on the face of the
earth, the United States government.
BA: How can this inform our understanding, or our imagination, of
how to move in a direction of a more sustainable culture, economy,
and society?
DW: Sustainable for how long? We have sustained ourselves for
two hundred years, so that’s sustainable in some way. You’re ask-
ing, can we maintain this for a thousand years? Probably not. Do we
want to be here a thousand years? If we do, it seems to me, that we
need to start putting security ahead of maximizing wealth and power.
What places do we avoid? What are the danger spots? How do we
try to achieve some sort of balance with the various parts of our
environment so that we can minimize the ups and downs of nature?
It seems to me that requires a lot of rules and regulation. It involves
lots of interference with personal freedoms. The communities that
have endured the longest on this planet are usually small agrarian
communities, where people have lived in a particular place, in the
same families, generations following generations. Historically they
have generally been patriarchal societies. They regulate how old
you can be before you can get married, who can own land. I don’t
know any of them that were ideally egalitarian— perfect freedoms
and perfect democracies. We should not expect perfection.
BA: So what about cities?
DW: Is there a model for cities? I doubt it. They are so divided, in
the case of New Orleans, by race and class lines, by ethnic origins,
by cultural lifestyles. For people to come together to agree on a set
of rules that most people feel are enforced fairly is a difficult achieve-
ment. It can be done, but we don’t have many examples. We have
plenty examples of people making decisions for others, deciding
who will go where and who cannot, but can we do that democrati-
cally? I am saying it will be a lot more difficult in large, complex
communities like a city.
For a lot of people the great thing about New Orleans is that
anything goes. It is a great city for liberty, having a good time,
evading rules and regulations, some yearlong Mardi Gras experi-
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ence. I don’t think that is a good foundation for building sustainability.
It might be a great way to live, in some respects. But sustainable
communities are usually those that infringe on such liberty and
they are often kind of boring communities. If you want to get a
little more sustainability into the future of a place called New Or-
leans, you’ve got to have more rules and regulations.
My feeling is that rules and regulations are best made by people
at the local level. But if you make rules and regulations at the local
level, you’ve got to assume financial responsibility at the local level.
If you pass the buck on, pass the bills to the Army Corps of Engi-
neers and Washington, they are going to make the rules and regu-
lations, holding the power of the purse.
BA: But the water, the city, the system is not local, right?
DW: Exactly.
BA: How do New Orleans and the problem of sustainability con-
nect to the Midwest?
DW: What is affecting New Orleans today is soil erosion of the
headwaters, the Kansas soils that are building up the delta. Accel-
erated erosion throughout the prairies is going to have an effect on
the city and its vulnerabilities. We’ve got toxic waste coming down,
particularly agricultural chemicals. We’ve already created “dead
zones,” massive fish kills resulting from oxygen depletion in the
Gulf of Mexico, which results from nitrogen flowing off our fields.
So the problem is in Chicago. It is in Kansas. When our practices
are that big and have that big of a continent-wide impact you’ve
got to have rules and regulations, eventually, that are on that kind
of scale. You’ve got to have watershed regulations. How you do
that democratically and fairly is extremely difficult, but the farmer
who is plowing Kansas and putting nitrogen into the soil has got a
responsibility for what happens down there. What New Orleans
can do locally, we call planning, which is another way to talk about
making rules and regulations. But I would not be very hopeful that
New Orleans could locally, through planning, come up with a sus-
tainable city for the future.
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BA: So I guess sustainability is just a different set of values that
regulate economic activity. The question becomes who creates
those values and when? Is this calamity a good opportunity to re-
define values?
DW: Disasters like this come along once in a while. They usually
don’t result in any profound reevaluation. That’s what I discov-
ered when studying the Dust Bowl of the 1930s. Some changes
were made, but there was no profound reevaluation. There still
remained a culture of high risk taking on the Great Plains—risk
over security. New Orleans may be a different situation. If evi-
dence begins to accumulate that in some way this is one outcome
of what is happening on a more global level, in terms of global
change, global warming, which is directly caused by our behavior,
that could change things.
We are faced, as a culture, with questions of burning fossil
fuels and their impact and depletion. Capitalism grew up with fos-
sil fuels providing unlimited abundance and unlimited possibilities
of growth. Nobody knows what effects the end of fossil fuels would
bring. It may mean we end up with a new technological panacea
or we end up with a global economic collapse. I’m certainly not a
prophet.
